This paper considers a sales mode selection problem under revenue sharing contracts between resale and agency modes for risk-averse manufacturers with traditional retail channel, direct selling channel, and e-commerce platform channel. By considering the factors including price competition intensity, market share, revenue sharing ratio, commission rate, and degree of risk aversion, we construct leader-follower game models with manufacturers as leaders and traditional retailers and e-commerce platforms as followers. To obtain optimal solutions, we discuss conditions to ensure the upper and lower models to be convex and then give the optimal strategies for all members in the network. Through numerical experiments, we analyze the involved parameters’ impact on sales mode selection strategy and the changing trends of each member's optimal pricing and profit under different sales modes. The numerical results reveal the following revelations: The manufacturer should choose the agency mode when the commission rate is low and the direct selling channel has a large market share. If both the commission rate and degree of risk aversion are high, direct selling channels have a low market share, and price competition intensity is weak, the manufacturer should choose the resale mode. The degree of risk aversion has an effect on each member’s optimal decision. Regardless of which sales mode the manufacturer chooses, the optimal price of each member decreases as the degree of risk aversion increases. Under certain conditions, the manufacturer’s choice of agency mode can create win-win situations with supply chain members.