How to cite this paper
Chen, K., Li, Y., Marco, K & Wang, Y. (2014). The relation between external governance environment and over-investment: Evidence from industry regulation.Management Science Letters , 4(11), 2329-2342.
Refrences
Averch, H., & Johnson, L. L. (1962). Behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint. The American Economic Review, 1052-1069.
Ahmed, A. S., & Duellman, S. (2011). Evidence on the role of accounting conservatism in monitoring managers’ investment decisions. Accounting & Finance, 51(3), 609-633.
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 81-106.
Bai, C. E., Lu, J., & Tao, Z. (2006). The multitask theory of state enterprise reform: empirical evidence from China. The American Economic Review, 353-357.
Bergman, N. K., & Nicolaievsky, D. (2007). Investor protection and the Coasian view. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(3), 738-771.
Biddle, G. C., Hilary, G., & Verdi, R. S. (2009). How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(2), 112-131.
Black, B. (2001). The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms. Emerging Markets Review, 2(2), 89-108.
Cambini, C., & Rondi, L. (2010). Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilities. Journal of Regulatory Economics,38(1), 1-26.
Chaney, P. K., Faccio, M., & Parsley, D. (2011). The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1), 58-76.
D’Mello, R., & Miranda, M. (2010). Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(2), 324-335.
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of financial Economics, 84(2), 299-329.
Fan, G., Wang, X., & Zhu, H. (2010). NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2009 Report. Beijing: Economic Science Press.
Fang, J. (2006). Evolvement of marketization and improvement of capital allocation efficiency. Economic Research Journal, 5, 005.
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. G., & Petersen, B. C. (1988). Financing constraints and corporate investment, 141-206.
Garc?a-Herrero, A., Gavila, S., & Santab?rbara, D. (2006). China & apos; s banking reform: an assessment of its evolution and possible impact. CESifo Economic Studies, 52(2), 304-363.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic review, 323-329.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics, and organization, 15(1), 222-279.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 1113-1155.
Lang, M., Smith Raedy, J., & Wilson, W. (2006). Earnings management and cross listing: Are reconciled earnings comparable to US earnings?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(1), 255-283.
Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American Economic Review, 537-558.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge university press.
Pagano, M., & Volpin, P. F. (2005). The political economy of corporate governance. American Economic Review, 1005-1030.
Perotti, E. C., & von Thadden, E. L. (2006). The political economy of corporate control and labor rents. Journal of Political Economy, 114(1), 145-175.
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silane, F., & Zamarripa, G. (2003). Related lending. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):231-268.
Richardson, S. (2006). Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2-3), 159-189.
Roques, F. A., & Savva, N. (2009). Investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 33(2), 507-524.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994). Politicians and firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 995-1025.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2002). The grabbing hand: Government pathologies and their cures. Harvard University Press.
Simon, J., John, M., & Christopher, W. (2002). Property Rights and Finance. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1335-1356.
Singh, M., & Davidson III, W. N. (2003). Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(5), 793-816.
Takayama, A. (1969). Behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint. The American Economic Review, 255-260.
Vogt, S. C. (1994). The cash flow/investment relationship: evidence from US manufacturing firms. Financial management, 3-20.
Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 595-613.
Xia, L., & Fang, Y. (2005). Government Control, Institutional Environment and Firm Value: Evidence from the Chinese Securities Market. Economic Research Journal, 5, 40-51.
Yang, H., Hu, Y. (2007). Institution environment and over-investment of free cash flow. Management World, 9, 99-116.
Ahmed, A. S., & Duellman, S. (2011). Evidence on the role of accounting conservatism in monitoring managers’ investment decisions. Accounting & Finance, 51(3), 609-633.
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 81-106.
Bai, C. E., Lu, J., & Tao, Z. (2006). The multitask theory of state enterprise reform: empirical evidence from China. The American Economic Review, 353-357.
Bergman, N. K., & Nicolaievsky, D. (2007). Investor protection and the Coasian view. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(3), 738-771.
Biddle, G. C., Hilary, G., & Verdi, R. S. (2009). How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(2), 112-131.
Black, B. (2001). The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms. Emerging Markets Review, 2(2), 89-108.
Cambini, C., & Rondi, L. (2010). Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilities. Journal of Regulatory Economics,38(1), 1-26.
Chaney, P. K., Faccio, M., & Parsley, D. (2011). The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1), 58-76.
D’Mello, R., & Miranda, M. (2010). Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(2), 324-335.
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of financial Economics, 84(2), 299-329.
Fan, G., Wang, X., & Zhu, H. (2010). NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2009 Report. Beijing: Economic Science Press.
Fang, J. (2006). Evolvement of marketization and improvement of capital allocation efficiency. Economic Research Journal, 5, 005.
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. G., & Petersen, B. C. (1988). Financing constraints and corporate investment, 141-206.
Garc?a-Herrero, A., Gavila, S., & Santab?rbara, D. (2006). China & apos; s banking reform: an assessment of its evolution and possible impact. CESifo Economic Studies, 52(2), 304-363.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic review, 323-329.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics, and organization, 15(1), 222-279.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 1113-1155.
Lang, M., Smith Raedy, J., & Wilson, W. (2006). Earnings management and cross listing: Are reconciled earnings comparable to US earnings?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(1), 255-283.
Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American Economic Review, 537-558.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge university press.
Pagano, M., & Volpin, P. F. (2005). The political economy of corporate governance. American Economic Review, 1005-1030.
Perotti, E. C., & von Thadden, E. L. (2006). The political economy of corporate control and labor rents. Journal of Political Economy, 114(1), 145-175.
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silane, F., & Zamarripa, G. (2003). Related lending. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):231-268.
Richardson, S. (2006). Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2-3), 159-189.
Roques, F. A., & Savva, N. (2009). Investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 33(2), 507-524.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994). Politicians and firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 995-1025.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2002). The grabbing hand: Government pathologies and their cures. Harvard University Press.
Simon, J., John, M., & Christopher, W. (2002). Property Rights and Finance. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1335-1356.
Singh, M., & Davidson III, W. N. (2003). Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(5), 793-816.
Takayama, A. (1969). Behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint. The American Economic Review, 255-260.
Vogt, S. C. (1994). The cash flow/investment relationship: evidence from US manufacturing firms. Financial management, 3-20.
Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 595-613.
Xia, L., & Fang, Y. (2005). Government Control, Institutional Environment and Firm Value: Evidence from the Chinese Securities Market. Economic Research Journal, 5, 40-51.
Yang, H., Hu, Y. (2007). Institution environment and over-investment of free cash flow. Management World, 9, 99-116.