How to cite this paper
Guo, R., Chen, Y & Fan, H. (2014). Honesty preferences and audit policy.Decision Science Letters , 3(2), 131-142.
Refrences
Antle, R. (1982). The Auditor as an Economic Agent. Journal of Accounting Research, 20, 503-527.
Baiman, S., Evans, J., & Nagarajan, N. (1991). Collusion in auditing. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 1-18.
Baiman, S., Evans, J., & Noel, J. (1987). Optimal contracts with a utility-maximizing auditor. Journal of Accounting Research, 25, 217-244.
Baiman, S., & Lewis, B. L. (1989). An experiment testing the behavioral equivalence of strategically equivalent employment contracts. Journal of Accounting Research, 27(1), 1–20.
Baron, D., & Besanko, D. (1984). Regulation, asymmetric information and auditing. Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 447-470.
Demski, J., & Sappington, D. (1987). Hierarchical regulatory control. Rand Journal of Economics, 18, 369-383.
Evans, J. H. III, Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., & Moser, D. V. (2001). Honesty in managerial reporting. The Accounting Review, 76, 537–559.
Greenberg, J. (1984). Avoiding tax avoidance: a (Repeated) game-theoretic approach. Journal of Economic Theory, 32, 1-13.
Guo, R., Tsay, Y., & Liu, C. (2005). Is the conditional audit policy necessary in a two-period audit scenario?. Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy, 17(2), 439-457.
Kofman, F., & Lawarree, J. (1993). Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econometrica, 61, 629-656.
Koford, K., & Penno, M. (1992). Accounting, principal-agent theory, and self-interested behavior. In Ethics and Agency Theory, edited by N. E. Bowie, and R. E. Freeman, 127–142. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Laffont, J., & Martimort, D. (1999). Separation of regulators against collusive behavior. Rand Journal of Economics, 30, 232-262.
Landsberger, M., & Meilijson, I. (1982). Incentive generating state dependent penalty system: The case of income tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 19, 333-352.
Rankin, F. W., Schwartz, S. T., & Young, R. A. (2008). The effect of honesty and superior authority on budget proposals. The Accounting Review, 83(4), 1083–1099.
Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 2, 181-214.
Baiman, S., Evans, J., & Nagarajan, N. (1991). Collusion in auditing. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 1-18.
Baiman, S., Evans, J., & Noel, J. (1987). Optimal contracts with a utility-maximizing auditor. Journal of Accounting Research, 25, 217-244.
Baiman, S., & Lewis, B. L. (1989). An experiment testing the behavioral equivalence of strategically equivalent employment contracts. Journal of Accounting Research, 27(1), 1–20.
Baron, D., & Besanko, D. (1984). Regulation, asymmetric information and auditing. Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 447-470.
Demski, J., & Sappington, D. (1987). Hierarchical regulatory control. Rand Journal of Economics, 18, 369-383.
Evans, J. H. III, Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., & Moser, D. V. (2001). Honesty in managerial reporting. The Accounting Review, 76, 537–559.
Greenberg, J. (1984). Avoiding tax avoidance: a (Repeated) game-theoretic approach. Journal of Economic Theory, 32, 1-13.
Guo, R., Tsay, Y., & Liu, C. (2005). Is the conditional audit policy necessary in a two-period audit scenario?. Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy, 17(2), 439-457.
Kofman, F., & Lawarree, J. (1993). Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econometrica, 61, 629-656.
Koford, K., & Penno, M. (1992). Accounting, principal-agent theory, and self-interested behavior. In Ethics and Agency Theory, edited by N. E. Bowie, and R. E. Freeman, 127–142. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Laffont, J., & Martimort, D. (1999). Separation of regulators against collusive behavior. Rand Journal of Economics, 30, 232-262.
Landsberger, M., & Meilijson, I. (1982). Incentive generating state dependent penalty system: The case of income tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 19, 333-352.
Rankin, F. W., Schwartz, S. T., & Young, R. A. (2008). The effect of honesty and superior authority on budget proposals. The Accounting Review, 83(4), 1083–1099.
Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 2, 181-214.