How to cite this paper
Gaitan, S., Saravia, J & Tellez, D. (2022). Board of directors and investment performance: A marginal Q approach.Accounting, 8(4), 419-430.
Refrences
Adams, R.B., Hermalin, B.E., & Weisbach, M.S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literacy, 48, 58–107. DOI: 10.1257/jel.48.1.58
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R., & Williamson, R. (2009). Differences in governance practices between US and foreign firms: Measurement, causes, and consequences. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3131–3169. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn107
Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2014). Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?. Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 383-403.
Baysinger, B.D., & Butler, H.N. (1985). Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law and Economic Organization, 1, 101–124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/764908
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporate Law, 27, 231–274.
Bruno, V.G., & Claessens, S. (2007). Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? The World Bank.
Coles, J.L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economy, 79, 431–468. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004
Coles, J. L., Daniel, Naveen, D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356.
Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D., & Naveen, L. (2012). Board advising. Available at SSRN 2002250. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2002250
Dahya, J., & McConnell, J. J. (2007). Board composition, corporate performance, and the Cadbury committee recommendation. Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, 42, 535–564. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109000004099
Dang, A. R., Houanti, L., Le, N. T., & Vu, M. C. (2018). Does corporate governance influence firm performance? Quantile regression evidence from a transactional economy. Applied Economics Letters, 25(14), 984-988.
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., Ozbas, O. 2010, When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 96, 195-214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.12.004
Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economy, 87, 157–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.006
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., & Larcker, D.F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal Financial Economy, 51, 371–406. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00058-0
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., Wells, M.T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal Financial Economy, 48, 35–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00003-8
Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288–307. https://doi.org/10.1086/260866
Fama, E.F., & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law Economy, 26, 301–325. https://www.jstor.org/stable/725104
Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M. a., & Raposo, C. C. (2011). Board structure and price informativeness. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(3), 523–545. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.007
Ferris, S.P., Jagannathan, M., Pritchard, A.C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance, 58, 1087–1111. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00559
Fich, E.M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance, 61, 689–724. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x
Fosberg, R. H. (1989). Outside directors and managerial monitoring. Akron Business and Economic Review, 20(2), 24-32.
Godoy-Bejarano, J. M., Ruiz-Pava, G. A., & Téllez-Falla, D. F. (2020). Environmental complexity, slack, and firm performance. Journal of Economics and Business, 112, 105933.
González, M., Téllez, D., & Trujillo, M. A. (2019). Governance, sentiment analysis, and initial public offering underpricing. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 27(3), 226-244.
Gugler, K., & Yurtoglu, B.B. (2003). Average q, marginal q, and the relation between ownership and performance. Economic Letters, 78, 379–384. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00261-6
Gugler, K., Mueller, D.C., & Yurtoglu, B.B. (2003). The impact of corporate governance on investment returns in developed and developing countries. Economic Journal, 113, F511–F539. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00167.x
Gugler, K., Mueller, D.C., & Yurtoglu, B.B. (2004). Corporate governance and the returns on investment. Journal of Law Economics, 47, 589–633. https://doi.org/10.1086/425062
Gugler, K., Mueller, D.C., & Yurtoglu, B.B. (2008). Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 688–705. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.007
Hermalin, B.E., & Weisbach, M.S. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management, 20(4), 101–112. DOI: 10.2307/3665716
Hermalin, B.E., & Weisbach, M.S. (2001). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature (No. w8161). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (2003). Board of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. Economic Policy Review, 9, 7-26.
Ishii, J., & Xuan, Y. (2014). Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes. Journal of Financial Economy, 112, 344–363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.007
Jensen, M.C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48, 831–880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J.W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, 48, 59–77. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40687360
Mace, M. (1986). Directors: Myth and Reality. Harvard Business School Press, Boston MA.
Mueller, D. C., & Reardon, E. A. (1993). Rates of return on corporate investment. Southern Economic Journal, 60(2), 430-453. DOI: 10.2307/1060090
Mueller, D. C., & Yun, S. L. (1998). Rates of Return over the Firm's Lifecycle. Industrial and Corporate Change, 7(2), 347-368. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/7.2.347
Mueller, D. C., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2000). Country legal environments and corporate investment performance. German Economic Review, 1(2), 187-220. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00011
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of financial economics, 26(2), 175-191. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(90)90002-H
Saravia, J.A. (2014). The lifecycle of the firm, corporate governance and investment performance. Corporate Ownership and Control, 11(2B), 224–238. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i2c1p6
Shi, M. (2019). Overinvestment and corporate governance in energy listed companies: Evidence from China. Finance Research Letters, 30, 436-445. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2019.05.017
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis. The journal of finance, 54(5), 1829-1853. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00168
Souther, M. E. (2021). Does board independence increase firm value? Evidence from Closed-End funds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 56(1), 313-336. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109019000929
Stuart, T. E., & Yim, S. (2010). Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(1), 174-189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.012
Pirotte, A., & Mur, J. (2017). Neglected dynamics and spatial dependence on panel data: consequences for convergence of the usual static model estimators. Spatial Economic Analysis, 12(2-3), 202-229. https://doi.org/10.1080/17421772.2016.1232839
Yang, D., & Kim, H. (2020). Managerial overconfidence and manipulation of operating cash flow: Evidence from Korea✰. Finance Research Letters, 32, 101343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2019.101343
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of financial economics, 40(2), 185-211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R., & Williamson, R. (2009). Differences in governance practices between US and foreign firms: Measurement, causes, and consequences. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3131–3169. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn107
Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2014). Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?. Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 383-403.
Baysinger, B.D., & Butler, H.N. (1985). Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law and Economic Organization, 1, 101–124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/764908
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporate Law, 27, 231–274.
Bruno, V.G., & Claessens, S. (2007). Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? The World Bank.
Coles, J.L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economy, 79, 431–468. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004
Coles, J. L., Daniel, Naveen, D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356.
Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D., & Naveen, L. (2012). Board advising. Available at SSRN 2002250. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2002250
Dahya, J., & McConnell, J. J. (2007). Board composition, corporate performance, and the Cadbury committee recommendation. Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, 42, 535–564. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109000004099
Dang, A. R., Houanti, L., Le, N. T., & Vu, M. C. (2018). Does corporate governance influence firm performance? Quantile regression evidence from a transactional economy. Applied Economics Letters, 25(14), 984-988.
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., Ozbas, O. 2010, When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 96, 195-214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.12.004
Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economy, 87, 157–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.006
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., & Larcker, D.F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal Financial Economy, 51, 371–406. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00058-0
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., Wells, M.T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal Financial Economy, 48, 35–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00003-8
Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288–307. https://doi.org/10.1086/260866
Fama, E.F., & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law Economy, 26, 301–325. https://www.jstor.org/stable/725104
Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M. a., & Raposo, C. C. (2011). Board structure and price informativeness. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(3), 523–545. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.007
Ferris, S.P., Jagannathan, M., Pritchard, A.C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance, 58, 1087–1111. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00559
Fich, E.M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance, 61, 689–724. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x
Fosberg, R. H. (1989). Outside directors and managerial monitoring. Akron Business and Economic Review, 20(2), 24-32.
Godoy-Bejarano, J. M., Ruiz-Pava, G. A., & Téllez-Falla, D. F. (2020). Environmental complexity, slack, and firm performance. Journal of Economics and Business, 112, 105933.
González, M., Téllez, D., & Trujillo, M. A. (2019). Governance, sentiment analysis, and initial public offering underpricing. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 27(3), 226-244.
Gugler, K., & Yurtoglu, B.B. (2003). Average q, marginal q, and the relation between ownership and performance. Economic Letters, 78, 379–384. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00261-6
Gugler, K., Mueller, D.C., & Yurtoglu, B.B. (2003). The impact of corporate governance on investment returns in developed and developing countries. Economic Journal, 113, F511–F539. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00167.x
Gugler, K., Mueller, D.C., & Yurtoglu, B.B. (2004). Corporate governance and the returns on investment. Journal of Law Economics, 47, 589–633. https://doi.org/10.1086/425062
Gugler, K., Mueller, D.C., & Yurtoglu, B.B. (2008). Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 688–705. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.007
Hermalin, B.E., & Weisbach, M.S. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management, 20(4), 101–112. DOI: 10.2307/3665716
Hermalin, B.E., & Weisbach, M.S. (2001). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature (No. w8161). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (2003). Board of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. Economic Policy Review, 9, 7-26.
Ishii, J., & Xuan, Y. (2014). Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes. Journal of Financial Economy, 112, 344–363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.007
Jensen, M.C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48, 831–880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J.W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, 48, 59–77. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40687360
Mace, M. (1986). Directors: Myth and Reality. Harvard Business School Press, Boston MA.
Mueller, D. C., & Reardon, E. A. (1993). Rates of return on corporate investment. Southern Economic Journal, 60(2), 430-453. DOI: 10.2307/1060090
Mueller, D. C., & Yun, S. L. (1998). Rates of Return over the Firm's Lifecycle. Industrial and Corporate Change, 7(2), 347-368. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/7.2.347
Mueller, D. C., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2000). Country legal environments and corporate investment performance. German Economic Review, 1(2), 187-220. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00011
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of financial economics, 26(2), 175-191. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(90)90002-H
Saravia, J.A. (2014). The lifecycle of the firm, corporate governance and investment performance. Corporate Ownership and Control, 11(2B), 224–238. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i2c1p6
Shi, M. (2019). Overinvestment and corporate governance in energy listed companies: Evidence from China. Finance Research Letters, 30, 436-445. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2019.05.017
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis. The journal of finance, 54(5), 1829-1853. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00168
Souther, M. E. (2021). Does board independence increase firm value? Evidence from Closed-End funds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 56(1), 313-336. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109019000929
Stuart, T. E., & Yim, S. (2010). Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(1), 174-189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.012
Pirotte, A., & Mur, J. (2017). Neglected dynamics and spatial dependence on panel data: consequences for convergence of the usual static model estimators. Spatial Economic Analysis, 12(2-3), 202-229. https://doi.org/10.1080/17421772.2016.1232839
Yang, D., & Kim, H. (2020). Managerial overconfidence and manipulation of operating cash flow: Evidence from Korea✰. Finance Research Letters, 32, 101343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2019.101343
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of financial economics, 40(2), 185-211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5