This study develops an empirical investigation of trust antecedents and consequences in creating a collaborative business relationship between distribution companies and retailers in the cosmetics market. A conceptual framework based on trust antecedents as inputs and trust consequences as outputs is designed for both parties. In order to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of each considered trust factor for each party, a fuzzy data envelopment analysis (FDEA) based approach is proposed. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model, a real-life case study is considered. The required data are collected using interview and questionnaires, and the reliability of the collected data is examined using the Cronbach’s alpha. The obtained results indicate that there is no significant difference between both parties’ tendency towards building a collaborative business relationship based on trust. The results also indicate that information sharing is not an effective trust antecedent for both parties. The “product quality” and “product price” are the most effective trust antecedents for retailers, while the “retailer’s financial conflicts records” along with “length of partnership” are the most effective trust antecedents for distribution companies. Finally, the most effective trust consequences for distribution companies and retailers are “information sharing” and “brand advertising”, respectively.

Supply chain members cannot act independently and they need to act as a part of a unified system and coordinated with other members. Therefore, a coordination mechanism may be necessary to motivate members to achieve coordination. In this paper, the coordination problem is studied in a two-level supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer where demand is a function of price and advertising expenditures in two scenarios. The first scenario is “No coordination”, and the other scenario is “coordination with Revenue sharing contract”. The models are solved using game theory, Cooperative and Nash equilibrium. Finally, numerical examples are presented indicating that the average expected profit in the second scenario, coordination with revenue sharing, is higher than the first scenario. In addition numerical examples indicate that as price and advertising elasticity to demand increase, profitability of supply chain decreases.

This paper presents the decentralized supply chain with two suppliers and two competing retailers. It also investigates the sourcing and pricing strategies of two retailers in a decentralized supply chain system under a supply disruption environment. These retailers face their individual stochastic demand markets; however, they compete with each other through a two-stage price and service operation. The interactive dynamics among retailers is characterized, including the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium in service and price games demonstrated.